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Abstract
In complex situations where there is an unclear link between the available options and an
advantageous outcome, visceral signals of arousal play a role in decision-making. Perception of the
body’s various visceral signals is called interoceptive awareness (IA). Exposure to stressful events
can impede the production and perception of these signals, leading to a potentially impaired
perception of risk and impeded decision-making. However, there is a paucity of research exploring
the impact of life event stress on IA, or how both of these factors may influence the dynamic
process of decision-making during risk. To address this gap the current study investigated how life
event stress may impact the assessment of risk in decision-making by impairing the perception of
visceral signals of arousal. A community sample of 86 subjects were recruited and given the Life
Experiences Survey (LES) to assess stress from life events, the Mental Tracking Method (MTM) to
determine IA, the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) to assess decision-making in situations involving risk,
and skin conductance levels (SCL) measured prior to each trial of the IGT as a visceral signal of
arousal. Results indicated that IA was negatively correlated with avoidance of risk on the IGT.
Breaking the 100 trials IGT into 5 blocks of 20, regression analyses showed that different factors of
interest each predicted safe choosing at different times. Less life event stress, as indicated by higher
LES scores, predicted more safe choosing for the first block of trials. Increased IA scores predicted
less safe choosing on the second and third blocks. Elevated SCL prior to risky choices compared to
safe choices predicted safe choosing for blocks 3, 4, and 5. Findings suggest a temporally dynamic
process of factors influencing risk assessment. Results also highlight the limitations of the MTM as
an indicator of interoception. Future research points toward more holistic measures for both IA and
life event stress to better understand their dynamic influence on decision-making during risk.
Keywords: interoception, interoceptive awareness, life event stress, autonomic arousal, decision-making, risk.

SMART CHOICES WHEN FACED WITH RISK

4

Introduction
Something is not quite right, but you can’t put your finger on it. You’re not sure why, but
something feels off. You make a decision without consciously weighing the pros and cons, reacting
to a feeling you haven’t yet put into words. Sensitivity to these physical indicators of emotion is
called interoceptive awareness (IA; Pollatos, Gramann, & Schandry, 2007). Though these signals are
rarely consciously noted, merely framing our affective state, they guide many of our choices,
interpretations, and thus our actions. This impact is even greater when the circumstances are risky
and unclear, during these situations physical states, or “gut feelings,” play a stronger role in
determining behavior. As such, improving IA might improve decision-making in risky situations.
Since stress can often impede our ability to notice bodily sensations, stress may negatively impact
decision-making in risky situations specifically by impeding IA. Modeling the relationship between
stress, IA, and decision-making during risk is a critical step in understanding how stress can put
people at increased risk for further negative outcomes by impairing their assessment of risk.
During complex situations where there is an unclear link between the available options and
an advantageous outcome, visceral signals of arousal can play a role in decision-making. Internal
signals of arousal have been shown to help people to learn to avoid making risky, disadvantageous
choices in favor of safer, advantageous ones (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997). The
extent to which one is aware of their somatic cues of arousal, IA, could then moderate one’s ability
to learn to avoid risky, disadvantageous, choices. Stress has been shown to have a strong impact on
IA (Schulz & Vögele, 2015). Current models of interoception and risk assessment have not taken
into account the impact of certain types of stress. Elucidating this relationship could lead to a better
understanding of how emotions in general guide behavior, when stress keeps them from doing so,
and how different types of stress can impede learning to avoid risky situations.
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In this paper pertinent theoretical and empirical knowledge is reviewed, beginning with the
evolution of theories of emotion and how they are intertwined with physiological states. Autonomic
arousal, the body’s reaction to internal or external emotionally arousing stimuli, is discussed along
with methods by which it is collected. The accurate perception of one’s physical state, IA, and how
this typically implicit process can be measured is discussed. Disruptions of interoception common to
various psychopathologies are detailed. Physiological responses to risk are considered, followed by
research on how these responses inform learning that is done outside of conscious awareness called
Implicit Learning. Stress, along with how the physical responses to stress may influence the
assessment or risk, is also considered.
Theories of Emotion
The subjective experience of emotion has long been understood to be intrinsically tied to
one’s physiological state (Barrett, 2017; Damasio, 1994; Schachter & Singer, 1962; Scherer, 2005).
Contemporary theories of emotion, starting with William James, have cited physiological arousal and
its recognition as necessary parts of the emotional process (James, 1884). James’ theory posited that
the body reacted to stimuli and it was the recognition of this physiological reaction which was the
emotion (Ellsworth, 1994; James, 1884). James’ theory is often over-simplified as stating that
emotions are the perception of bodily changes that occur in response to a stimulus; however, James
later clarified that the perception of bodily changes in response to stimuli is a necessary component
of emotion (Ellsworth, 1994).
James’ emphasis on emotion as the labelling of an affective state was later elaborated upon in
the Two-Factor theory of Emotion (Schachter & Singer, 1962). According to this theory emotion is
comprised of two factors, physiological arousal and a cognitive label. When physiological arousal is
noticed, a reason for this arousal is ascribed based on the current situation, and based on this a
cognitive label ascribed. These two together form the emotion. Arousal, within this theory, is
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uniform and one dimensional; it could be low or high but the authors stated that there was no
difference between the types of arousal elicited by different emotional states (Schachter & Singer,
1962). They concluded, and supported with research, that arousal is felt, and then a reason for this
arousal searched for. In their experiments subjects were injected with epinephrine or a placebo, and
then either induced by the behaviors of a confederate to ascribe their physical state to anger,
euphoria, or given no such emotional behavior modeling (Schachter & Singer, 1962). From their
experiments, they deduced that if a cause for physiological arousal is found, the cognitive label of an
emotion is applied and the emotion experienced. If no cause for the physiological state is ascribed,
because the state was not noticed or no reason for emotional activation found, the subject would
neither report nor exhibit any emotional arousal (Schachter & Singer, 1962). This view of arousal as
being undifferentiated among emotions was later challenged by studies that induced different
emotions and recorded distinct patterns of physiological arousal, such as the unconscious activation
of different facial muscles (Ekman, Levenson, & Friesen, 1983), changes in heart rate and skin
conductance (Kreibig, 2010), or self-reports of somatic regions that felt differentially activated or deactivated (Nummenmaa, Glerean, Hari, & Hietanen, 2014). While the cognitive interpretation of
arousal remains important, subsequent research has shown that rather than cognition determining
the interpretation and effect of arousal, somatic cues of arousal may guide cognition, even without
conscious awareness it is doing so (Damasio, Everitt, & Bishop, 1996).
According to the Somatic Marker Hypothesis different marker signals, somatic cues such as
soreness or rapid heart rate, play a dominant role in the perception of emotion (Damasio, 1994).
Somatic information can influence these cognitions either covertly, outside of conscious awareness,
or overtly, within conscious awareness, by biasing decision-making or the interpretation of stimuli
(Damasio et al., 1996). The mental representation of the somatic self, based on afferent somatic
feedback, is seen as an essential part of the emotional process and the primary pathway through
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which emotion is perceived both overtly and covertly. Emotion is proposed to guide behavior
through the subjective experience of physiological arousal. Research using subjects with damage to
sections of their brains have shown that the reduction in physiological arousal is also coupled with
reductions in affect and difficulties in decision-making (Bechara, 2004; Bechara & Martin, 2004;
Bechara, Tranel, & Damasio, 2002; Wiens, 2005) The Somatic Marker Hypothesis is a widely utilized
theory of emotion currently, as it has the advantage of defining what is otherwise an internal
subjective experience as inseparable from observable physiological changes, such as changes in heart
rate or skin conductance, that can be recorded and measured quantitatively (Bechara & Damasio,
2005; Damasio et al., 1996; Miu, Heilman, & Houser, 2008).
Given the aforementioned complex interaction between arousal and cognition, compounded
by the misleading lay definitions of what an emotion is, Scherer (2005) sought to clarify the
definition of an emotion with the Component Process theory of Emotion. This theory defined an
emotion as a brief episode of interrelated, synchronized changes across several subsystems in
response to the appraisal of a stimulus, internal or external, as it related to the concerns of the
observer (Scherer, 2005). A central aspect of this theory is emotions are appraisal driven, and that
the relevant stimulus and its consequences must be relevant to concerns of the observer. In this
view emotions serve as relevance detectors, evaluating stimuli implicitly and guiding behavior by
adjusting arousal and affect (Scherer, 2005). Emotion, according to this theory, can be broken into
five components: cognitive appraisal, bodily symptoms, motivational aspects, motor expression, and
the subjective feeling. The motivational component is the aspect of emotion that prepares and
directs action in a certain direction, which could be said to be the evolutionarily most important
aspect of emotion. Motor expressions include the communication of reactions and behavioral
intentions, arguably a mix of the already considered motivational components and physiological
reactions. Subjective feeling states, which are most commonly what folk definitions of emotion tend
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to describe, are distinguished as a separable part of the emotion process but are not emotions in and
of themselves. Interestingly, in this theory love is defined as a stable interpersonal attitude with
strong positive feeling state, and not an emotion since it does not carry a specific cognitive
component and is sustained over long periods, whereas emotions are of short duration (Scherer,
2005). Like the Somatic Marker Hypothesis (Damasio, 1994) this theory sees emotion as
indistinguishable from physiological changes, and functions primarily as a guide for behavior
(Scherer, 2005). It expands on the previous theory by incorporating the motivational component as
a defining aspect and drawing greater focus on the role of appraisal as the instigator and determinant
of subsequent emotional experiences (Scherer, 2005).
Recently the nature of emotion as a reaction to a stimulus was challenged by the Theory of
Constructed Emotion (Barrett, 2017). Barrett challenges some notions that are at the basis of
emotion theory. The Somatic Marker Hypothesis posits that each emotion is attributable to a
specific combination of somatic signs of arousal, and that these physiological changes are a reaction
to a perceived stimulus (Damasio, 1994). The Component Process Theory proposes that an implicit
appraisal of stimuli produce a cascade of changes, both cognitive and physiological, intended to
guide and prepare for a reaction to the stimulus (Scherer, 2005). Both of these see emotion as a
reaction that implicitly guides behavior in response to a specific stimulus (Damasio, 1994, Scherer,
2005). These build on the findings of Reber (1989), who coined the term “implicit learning” to
describe how the mind creates an internal representation of the environment that is used to solve
problems and make accurate predictions independent of any conscious efforts or understanding.
Based on observations from a meta-analysis of neuro-imaging research, the Theory of Constructed
Emotion posits that the mind is constantly recognizing patterns and making predictions of the
various outcomes that may result from the current experience based on previous experiences, and
that these predictions are experienced in the body as the physical signs of affect (Barrett, 2017).
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Emotion then becomes not purely a reaction to discreet perceived stimuli but the result of a
constant sequence of pattern recognition guiding decision-making towards what is biologically
advantageous (Barrett, 2017). Barrett’s theory supports previous research that has shown that
subjects who experience reduced or no autonomic arousal, due to brain lesions or psychopathology,
show difficulty not just making decisions but specifically predictive decisions in situations of
uncertainty, in both laboratory or real-world settings (Bechara et al., 1997; Bechara et al., 2000;
Furman, Waugh, Bhattacharjee, Thompson, & Gotlib, 2013; Miu et al., 2008).
A common thread to each of these theories is that the subjective experience of emotion
serves the purpose of identifying emotionally salient situations and preparing the organism for an
advantageous response. When the appropriate response includes a heightened level of physical
activity the sympathetic branch of the autonomic nervous system is activated in a process called
autonomic arousal.
Autonomic Arousal
Autonomic arousal is the reflexive and unconscious activation of the sympathetic nervous
system in response to an internal or external motivating stimulus (Cacioppo, Tassinary, & Berntson,
2007). Activation of the sympathetic nervous system prepares the body for activity, accelerating
heart rate and slowing digestion, whereas activation of the parasympathetic nervous system prepares
the body to rest and digest. Activation of the autonomic nervous system has been shown to be
differentiated, comprised of different combinations of activation depending on the emotion(s)
elicited by the stimulus (Ekman et al., 1983; Nummenmaa et al., 2014). Since autonomic arousal is
outside of conscious control and reactive to emotionally salient stimuli, it is often used in studies of
emotion as a proxy for different aspects of emotional arousal.
Skin conductance is a reliable and widely used measure of autonomic arousal (Dawson,
Schell, & Filion, 2007). In this measure, a passive current is applied to the skin, usually on the palm
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of the non-dominant hand, and when stimuli are presented that increase arousal, the amount of
eccrine sweat in the dermal layer increases, reducing electrical resistance and increasing the amount
of current passing through the skin (Cacioppo et al., 2007). This brief elevation in conductance is
called a skin conductance response (SCR). Arousal as measured by SCR reflects only the level of
autonomic activation, with no differentiation for the emotional valence of the stimulus (Cacioppo et
al., 2007). Larger and more prolonged electrodermal responses have been associated with heightened
emotional reactivity (Norris, Larsen, & Cacioppo, 2007).
Cardiac activity is a useful physiological proxy for emotional affect as it is easy to measure
and highly responsive to input from both the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous systems
(Cacioppo et al., 2007; Thayer, Åhs, Fredrikson, Sollers, & Wager, 2012). Heart rate is typically
measured via electrocardiogram (ECG), with sensors placed on the chest that record the electrical
activity from activation of the heart (Cacioppo et al., 2007). When a novel stimulus is presented
there is an initial deceleration of heart rate lasting one to two seconds, which is considered an
orienting response and driven by activation of the parasympathetic nervous system, followed by
heart rate acceleration, a preparation for action that is driven by activation of the sympathetic
nervous system (Bradley, 2009; Pollatos, Herbert, Matthias, & Schandry, 2007). Short-term
sympathetic activation from heightened emotional arousal can be measured as increases in the
average beats per minute (BPM; Halligan, Michael, Wilhelm, Clark, & Ehlers, 2006) or increases in
volumetric cardiac output (CO; Jamieson, Nock, & Mendes, 2012). Heart rate varies naturally,
increasing during inhalation to maximize absorption of oxygen, and decreasing during exhalation to
conserve energy (Cacioppo et al., 2007). Due to a shared dependence on activation of the vagus
nerve, heart rate variability is a reliable measure of the capacity for the parasympathetic nervous
system to reduce autonomic arousal (Thayer et al., 2012). In particular this measure has been useful
in determining if cardiac hyper-arousal symptoms are the product of hyper-activation of the
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sympathetic nervous system or an under-activation of the parasympathetic nervous system
(Cacioppo et al., 2007; Thayer et al., 2012). Heart rate variability has been shown to be reduced in
populations whose symptoms include chronic hyper-arousal, including Panic Disorder (PD),
Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD), and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), indicating that
these symptoms may be driven not just by a higher sympathetic reactivity but also by a dysfunction
of the parasympathetic nervous system’s ability to reduce emotional arousal (Chalmers, Quintana,
Maree, Abbott, & Kemp, 2014; Cohen, Benjamin, Geva, Matar, Kaplan, & Kotler, 2000; Halligan et
al., 2006; Pittig, Arch, Lam, & Craske, 2013; Tan, Dao, Farmer, Sutherland, & Gevirtz, 2011).
Autonomic physiological changes have been shown to be effective proxies for the
measurement of the subjective experiences of emotional arousal. However, while different patterns
of physiological arousal have been shown to correspond to different emotive states (Ekman et al.,
1983; Kreibig, 2010), these measures are limited by capturing only levels of arousal, i.e. sympathetic
versus parasympathetic input, and omit other factors intrinsic to emotion such as the valence, degree
of positivity or negativity, or the subjective feeling component (Scherer, 2005). Though limited,
measures of physiological arousal make it possible to quantify and measure differences in subjective
physical experience in response to emotional stimuli (Dawson et al., 2007; Norris et al., 2007; Pittig
et al., 2013; Tan et al., 2011), further reinforcing the association between physical state and
emotional experience (Damasio, 1994; Schachter & Singer, 1962; Scherer, 2005).
Interoceptive Awareness
Given the important role bodily signals play in various theories of emotion, sensitivity to
these signals is vital for the recognition and regulation of emotion (Damasio, 1994; Gross, 2013;
Wiens, 2005). The awareness and integration of afferent somatic information is called IA (Calì,
Ambrosini, Picconi, Mehling, & Committeri, 2015; Bechara & Naqvi, 2004; Pollatos, TrautMattausch, Schroeder, Schandry, 2007). Researchers have clarified this definition to include both
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explicit awareness, when signs of emotion such as sweaty palms or increased heart rate come into
conscious awareness, and implicit awareness, how signs from the body constantly inform a general
state of being without the individual signals coming into conscious awareness (Calì et al., 2015).
Explicit awareness of the somatic signals of emotion can inform the interpretation of one’s self and
circumstances, and thus subsequent thoughts and behaviors (Gross, 2013; Schachter & Singer,
1962). Implicit perception of the bodily signals of emotion, even though outside of conscious
awareness, have been shown to guide behavior, particularly in situations where outcomes are unclear
(Bechara, 2004; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001). IA is thought to include, but is
distinguishable from, two separate abilities. The ability to accurately perceive or distinguish somatic
information when intentionally trying to do so is called interoceptive accuracy, while the likelihood
of consciously thinking about somatic information called interoceptive sensibility (Garfinkel, Seth,
Barrett, Suzuki, & Critchley, 2015). Though related these concepts are still independent. Because one
might be able to accurately distinguish somatic cues when consciously trying to do so, this does not
necessarily mean that somatic information will be noticed or utilized when one is not consciously
prompted to do so. Similarly, a greater likelihood of noticing somatic information does not mean
that it will be interpreted accurately.
While it has been suggested that IA is a mostly static trait (Stevens, Gerlach, Cludius, Silkens,
Craske, & Hermann, 2011), other studies have shown that IA can be increased with self-oriented
attention (Ainley, Maister, Brokfeld, Farmer, & Tsakiris, 2013; Ainley, Tajadura-Jiménez,
Fotopoulou, & Tsakiris, 2012). These contrasting findings could imply that current measurements of
IA lack reliability (Ferentzi, Drew, Tihanyi, & Koteles, 2018) or require greater control for
confounding variables (Murphy Brewer, Hobson, Catmur, & Bird, 2018). Or, if IA is malleable, this
could imply that targeted interventions could improve the sensitivity to and use of interoceptive
information, which could then have an effect on certain psychopathologies (Dunn, Dalgleish,
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Ogilvie, & Lawrence, 2007; Ehlers & Breuer, 1992; Furman et al., 2013) or decision-making during
risk (Dunn Galton, Morgan, Evans, Oliver, Meyer, Cusack, Lawrence, Dalgleish, 2010; Werner,
Jung, Duschek, & Schandry, 2009).
Most research in IA has been complicated by the paradox of using explicit knowledge of one
physiological system to measure what in vivo is often an implicit process involving feedback from
multiple physiological systems. IA is most commonly measured using the Mental Tracking Method
(MTM; Schandry, 1981; Schulz & Vögele, 2015). During this task subjects are asked to count their
heartbeats during a series of short time intervals without taking their pulse, and their reported
number of heart beats is compared to their actual number of heart beats to create a score that
reflects the subject’s accuracy (Schandry, 1981). Another similar method called the Heartbeat
Discrimination Task (HDT) has the subject determine whether an audio cue is or is not
synchronized with their heartbeat, with differences typically being between 200 and 350 milliseconds
for unsynchronized trials (Katkin, Wiens, & Ohman, 2001; Whitehead, Drescher, Heiman, &
Blackwell, 1977). Schandry’s MTM is used more often to measure IA for two reasons: first it is an
easier task to administer, and second asking subjects to discern if an audio cue and their heart beat
are happening in tandem divides the subject’s attention and this becomes a potential confound
(Schulz & Vögele, 2015). Both the MTM and HDT are technically measures of interoceptive
accuracy but are used as proxies for IA. However, interoceptive accuracy, interoceptive sensibility,
and IA have been shown in at least one study to be related only among those with high interoceptive
accuracy (Garfinkel et al., 2015). This implies that interoceptive accuracy may not always correlate
with overall IA. Also, the MTM and HDT measure sensitivity to cardiac information specifically,
and IA is considered to encompass feedback from many physiological channels (Pollatos, Gramann
et al., 2007). Some research has questioned the generalizability of cardiac sensitivity to sensitivity to
other somatic indicators of emotion (Ceunen, Van Diest, & Vlaeyen, 2012), but most research on IA
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accepts sensitivity to cardiac feedback as an effective indicator of the awareness of other somatic
markers (Herbert et al., 2011; Pollatos, Gramann et al., 2007; Schulz & Vögele, 2015; Whitehead &
Drescher, 1980). While both the MTM and HDT measure cardiac sensitivity when a subject has
been explicitly instructed to attend to their heart beats, other measurable physiological changes can
influence behavior while remaining entirely outside conscious awareness (Damasio, Everitt, &
Bishop, 1996). Researchers have raised several valid questions regarding the construct validity of the
MTM. Studies have shown scores on the MTM do not always correlate with other tests of cardiac
sensitivity (Whitehead et al., 1977), and that repeated administrations of the MTM have low testretest reliability (Ferentzi et al., 2018). Several possible confounds have been shown to influence
scores on the MTM but are rarely controlled for, such as regular exercise (Herbert et al., 2007), a
priori knowledge of one’s resting heart rate (Khalsa, Rudrauf, Damasio, Davidson, Lutz, & Tranel,
2008) and attentional resources (Murphy et al., 2018). Despite these drawbacks, the MTM is still the
most commonly used behavioral measure to determine IA (Schulz & Vögele, 2015).
IA can also be assessed through a self-report questionnaire. The Multidimensional
Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness (MAIA) is a 32 item self-report questionnaire designed to
assess eight concepts that contribute to IA; such as emotional awareness “I notice how my body
changes when I am angry” and self-regulation “I can use my breath to reduce tension” (Mehling,
Price, Daubenmier, Acree, Bartmess, & Stewart; 2012). These items are aimed at addressing
behaviors and beliefs that would be employed by those with greater IA and may reflect the
likelihood that interoceptive information is consciously considered, or interoceptive sensibility. This
measure may have greater ecological validity than the MTM or HDT by capturing more data about
how somatic signals are interpreted and used rather than just how well signals are or are not
perceived (Mehling et al., 2012; Schandry, 1981).
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Awareness of the internal signs of emotion has been related to the intensity of the subjective
experience of emotion (Ehlers & Breuer, 1996; Herbert, Herbert, & Pollatos, 2011) or the lack
thereof (Murphy et al., 2018). As afferent somatic information reaches the brain, IA mediates the
level of activation of the associated neural structures of emotion (Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein,
Öhman, & Dolan, 2004; Pollatos, Gramann et al., 2007). One study compared those with high IA,
as measured by the MTM, versus those with low IA on how their subjective experience of emotion
while being presented with pleasant, neutral, and unpleasant pictures (Pollatos, Herbert et al., 2007).
It was expected, based on somatic theories of emotion, that those with high IA would be more
sensitive to the somatic markers of emotion and thus experience higher subjective levels of emotion.
This hypothesis was confirmed via self-report and via increased activation of associated neural
structures as measured by electroencephalogram (EEG; Pollatos, Herbert et al., 2007). In all picture
conditions, positive, negative, or neutral, the high IA groups showed greater activation of the
prefrontal cortices and somatosensory cortices, structures associated with top-down regulation and
perception of somatic sensory input respectively. The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), associated
with interpreting the emotional salience of stimuli, showed more activation in the high IA group, but
only for pleasant and unpleasant pictures and not for neutral pictures. The insula, a structure
associated with integration of somatic information, showed greater activation in the high IA group
but only during negative picture presentation (Pollatos, Herbert et al., 2007). Other studies have
shown this region to be more active overall in those with high IA scores (Critchley et al., 2004).
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies using HPT and MTM tasks have also found
the insula and ACC to be key structures that are differentially activated by interoceptive versus
exteroceptive attention, with increased volumes and connectivity associated with higher IA scores
(Critchley et al., 2004; Wiebking, Duncan, Tiret, Hayes, Marjaǹska, Doyon, Bajbouj, & Northoff,
2014). Interestingly, these studies also showed that subjects with higher IA and greater activity in
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their insula also reported greater general negative affect and greater depressive symptoms (Critchley
et al., 2004; Wiebking et al., 2014), implying that the interpretation of somatic signals may also play a
role in psychopathology.
IA and Psychopathology
Somatic signals from the body are intimately tied to the experience of emotion and
expectations of somatic experience, and disruptions in these signals have been associated with
various pathologies (Dunn et al., 2007; Ehlers & Breuer, 1992; Harshaw, 2015; Khalsa & Lapidus,
2016). Increased IA has been associated with stronger autonomic arousal and increases in the
reported intensity of emotions, both positive and negative (Bechara & Naqvi, 2004; Critchley et al.,
2004; Kindermann & Werner, 2014; Pollatos, Gramann et al., 2007). Reduced awareness of somatic
signals has been suggested to contribute to anhedonia commonly associated with depression
(Harshaw, 2015). Both major depression and alexithymia, difficulty identifying or describing one’s
own feelings, have been correlated with lower IA scores (Dunn et al., 2007; Furman et al., 2013;
Herbert et al., 2011). Interoceptive accuracy has been shown to be elevated in anxiety related
disorders (Ehlers & Breuer, 1992; Sturges & Goetsch, 1996; Schmitz, Blechert, Krämer, Asbrand, &
Tuschen-Caffier, 2012). Using the MTM, Ehlers and Breuer (1992) found that subjects with panic
disorder were more accurate in counting their heartbeats than those with other anxiety disorders,
depression, or healthy controls. The authors theorize that this could be driven in part by selforiented attention in anticipation of upcoming panic attacks (Ehlers & Breuer, 1996). This concept
was reinforced by Sturges & Goetsch (1996), who showed that anxiety sensitivity, fear of the
experience of anxiety symptoms, predicted higher accuracy of heartbeat detection. Other anxiety
disorders, such as generalized anxiety and social phobias, have also displayed higher IA than healthy
controls (Ehlers & Breuer, 1992; Schmitz et. al., 2012; Stevens et al., 2011). This has been proposed
to be due in part to the self-oriented attention common to anxiety increasing likelihood that somatic
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signals come into conscious perception, and anxiety increasing heart rate to the point that it is easier
to then perceive (Ehlers & Breuer, 1996; Stevens et. al., 2011).
IA has also been shown to be lower in those that are more likely to have a disrupted or
distant relationship to their body due to weight. BMI has been shown to be negatively correlated
with IA scores in overweight and obese groups but not the healthy controls (Herbert & Pollatos,
2014). Eating disorders, anorexia nervosa and bulimia, have been associated with lower IA as
measured by both self-report and the MTM (Fassino, Pierò, Gramaglia, & Abbate-Daga, 2004;
Pollatos, Kurz, Albrecht, Schreder, Kleemann, Schöpf, Kopietz, Wiesmann, & Schandry, 2008). In
particular self-objectification, the tendency to experience one’s body principally as an object to be
judged for its appearance, is commonly associated with eating disorders and has been negatively
correlated with IA (Ainley & Tsakiris, 2013). In each of these groups where a person may be more
likely to feel distinct from or at odds with their physical self, both behavioral and self-report
measures of IA have been shown to be lower.
The insula is the region of the brain that aggregates afferent somatic signals and transmits
this data to the frontal cortex so it can be perceived and is believed to play a key role in addiction
(Naqvi & Bechara, 2009). Subjects who experienced damage to their insula, an area associated with
integration of somatic information and IA (Critchley et al., 2004), were able to quit smoking more
easily (Naqvi, Rudrauf, Damasio, & Bechara, 2007), or experienced no cravings when they quit
smoking (Gray & Critchley, 2007). Somatic information can then be said to play a strong role in the
experience of craving among addicts, and IA is likely dysregulated, alternately increased or
decreased, by different phases of the addiction cycle (Goldstein, Bechara, Garavan, Childress,
Paulus, & Volkow, 2009). Labeling and understanding somatic cues is a key aspect to some drug
treatment programs (Najavits, 2002). Increasing interoceptive accuracy through body-oriented
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mindfulness training was found in one small study to promote relapse prevention (Price & SmithDiJulio, 2016).
Understanding the role that afferent somatic information plays in various psychopathologies
can elucidate the role that this information plays in healthy day to day life, and how disruptions or
deficits the perception of this information may impact healthy functioning. As pathological
disturbances dysregulate the accurate perception of signals from the body, reducing IA, they impact
both subjective experience and behavior in ways that may not be immediately apparent. One such
possible outcome of dysregulated perception of internal feedback would be an impairment of
implicit learning that is done outside of consciousness (Bechara, 2004; Furman et. al., 2013).
Risk
Afferent somatic information provides a perceptual framework for experience which, when
unavailable or unreliable, can contribute to pathology but when available and accurate contributes to
decision-making in the form of insight or “gut feelings” (Katkin et al., 2001). Decisions are rarely
made in a purely rational, consequence-based fashion (Damasio, 1994; Loewenstein et al., 2001).
Emotion often plays a stronger role than purely cognitive appraisal in determining behavioral
responses to risk (Loewenstein et al., 2001). As the connection between available choices and
positive outcomes becomes less clear, emotion plays an even larger role in decision-making (Isen &
Means, 1983; Loewenstein et al., 2001). Damasio (1994) referred to the somatic changes felt during
decision-making as anticipatory emotions and proposed, based on his research, they were an
experiential representation of expected outcomes of that decision. This theory was supported by
Bechara and colleague’s (1997) study using the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT).
In a study by Bechara and colleagues’ (1997) subjects with lesions in their ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) were compared against normal healthy controls on their performance of
the IGT. During each trial of the IGT subjects are shown four decks of playing cards and asked to
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choose one; two of the decks are safe decks, providing consistent low rewards, and two of the decks
are risky decks, providing larger rewards but occasionally resulting in very large penalties. In the
Bechara (1997) study healthy subjects displayed autonomic arousal prior to risky choices, as
measured by SCRs, compared to subjects with lesions in their vmPFC who showed no autonomic
arousal. The healthy subjects who developed autonomic arousal prior to risky choices learned to
avoid the risky decks, and eventually earned more facsimile money on the task. The lesioned subjects
who did not show autonomic arousal prior to making risky decisions did not learn to avoid the risky
decks and over time earned less facsimile money (Bechara et al., 1997). Bechara also showed that
subjects with vmPFC lesions exhibited difficulty making decisions when outcomes were unclear in
real-world tasks such as making plans, choosing friends and partners, or organizing social activities
(Bechara, 2004; Bechara et al., 2002).
According to Bechara (1997), healthy subjects who exhibited autonomic arousal before
making risky choices began avoiding the risky choices before consciously knowing why they were
doing so. This sort of learning, where problems are solved or decisions made about the environment
independently from conscious effort, is called implicit learning (Reber, 1989). Bechara’s (1997)
assertion that these decisions were made prior to conscious understanding for why they were being
done has since drawn criticism (Maia & McClelland, 2004). Subsequent use of the IGT using more
concrete questions for the subjects regarding what they knew about the task and when, compared to
Bechara’s (1997) use of more open-ended questions, showed that subjects avoided risky choices
when they consciously knew to do so (Maia & McClelland, 2004). This finding could imply that
somatic feedback does inform decision-making, but in a manner similar to earlier theories of
emotion where internal somatic feedback must first occur (autonomic arousal) and a cause for the
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feeling state attributed (the risky decks) prior to corrective action being taken (choosing less
risk)(Damasio et al., 1996; James, 1884; Schachter & Singer, 1962).
Decision-making, particularly when there is an element of risk, has been tied to the
activation of regions in the brain associated with the integration of somatic information (Paulus,
Rogalsky, Simmons, Feinstein, & Stein, 2003). One study, using fMRI and a decision-making
involving risk, found a strong inverse relationship between insula activation and risky behavior
(Paulus et al., 2003). In their study the right anterior insula was activated prior to risky choices but
not safe ones, and the degree of activation predicted both their rate of learning to make safe choices
in the decision-making task, and their likelihood of avoiding risk in general according to self-report
questionnaires (Paulus et al., 2003). This region of the brain has also been shown to play a role both
in the assessment of risk (Werner, Schweitzer, Meindl, Duschek, Kambeitz, & Schandry, 2013) and
in the integration of somatic information (Hassanpour, Yan, Wang, Lapidus, Arevian, Simmons,
Feusner, & Khalsa, 2016). Together this research further connects successful avoidance of risk with
the experience of somatic information.
Stress
Stress can greatly influence the capacity to perceive somatic information, either elevating
interoception when stress draws attention to the self or decreasing it almost entirely when attention
is focused somewhere else (Schulz & Vögele, 2015). Increases in heart rate and blood pressure
produced by sympathetic activation can make heart rate easier to detect (Moor et. al., 2005;
Schandry, Bestler, and Montoya, 1993; Schandry & Specht, 1981), but attention is more likely to be
focused on salient aspects of the stressor while peripheral information, such as signals from the
body, are less likely to be noticed or integrated (Erickson, Drevets, & Schulkin, 2003; Schulz &
Vögele, 2015) Laboratory research on IA has been confounded by the fact that acute stress
inductions can increase or decrease IA (Ainley et al., 2012; Durlik, Brown, & Tsakiris, 2014; Preston,
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Buchanan, Stansfield, & Bechara, 2007; Schulz & Vögele, 2015). Chronic stress can dysregulate the
mechanisms of arousal, altering the physiological baseline and desensitizing receptors to signals of
sympathetic activation.
Acute stress inductions have been shown to increase or decrease IA, depending on the focus
of the stressor (Ainley et al., 2013; Preston et al., 2007; Steptoe & Vögele, 1992). Public speaking,
either the anticipation or performance thereof, has been used to induce stress and shown to increase
interoceptive accuracy (Durlik et. al., 2014; Schandry & Specht, 1981). Other lab stress inductions
such as mental arithmetic tasks (Smith, 1967) have been shown to have no effect on IA (Gray,
Taggart, Sutton, Groves, Holdright, Bradbury, Brull, & Critchley, 2007; Steptoe & Vögele, 1992) or
to decrease it (Fairclough & Goodwin, 2007). It is worth noting that in these studies other measures
than the MTM were used, such as electroencephalography to detect heartbeat evoked potentials
(Gray et al., 2007). Some researchers have suggested that this may be an effect of where the stressors
place the subject’s attention (Schulz, Lass-Hennemann, Sütterlin, Schächinger, & Vögele, 2013).
Public speaking is stressful because it invites attention and scrutiny toward the self (Durlik et al.,
2014), not unlike how subjects with panic disorder focused attention on themselves in anticipation
of panic attacks (Ehlers & Breuer, 1996). This theory is supported by research that shows selfreferential attention, through writing of a narrative or looking at one’s self in the mirror, has been
shown to experimentally increase IA scores without any stress induction (Ainley et al., 2012; Ainley
et al., 2013). As stress focuses attention the stressor to the exclusion of peripheral information
(Erickson et al., 2003) self-oriented stressors could increase IA to the exclusion of other pertinent
cues, and externally focused stressors would focus attention on their pertinent features potentially at
the expense of somatic feedback. This could explain some of the findings on the effects of chronic
life stressors on IA.
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Chronic stress does not have a clear relationship to IA (Schulz et al., 2013; McEwen, 2000).
While acute stress activation can lead to stronger and more easily detected somatic signals (Moor et
al., 2005) chronic stress can result in a blunted reaction to acute stress; this may be partially due to
stress “tolerance” where the body has grown accustomed to sympathetic activation, and partially due
to a reduction of the physical resources required for arousal (McEwen, 2000; Schulz et al., 2013; Tak
& Rosmalen, 2010). In both cases the sensitivity to changes in somatic information could become
attenuated.
As stress increases to the point of becoming traumatic somatic cues from the body, due to
their intensity and association with the trauma stimulus, become themselves aversive stimuli that are
progressively numbed and at a certain point dissociated from entirely. Indeed, complex PTSD (CPTSD) which is associated with exposure to particularly severe, interpersonal, and chronic stress
(Herman, 2015) is strongly associated with dissociation, a psychological removal from one’s physical
body and experience (Ford & Courtois, 2014). PTSD has been linked to a reduced ability to
recognize and articulate subjective emotional experience (Van Der Kolk, 2006), with some studies
showing an increase in the numbing of emotional affect as the intensity and duration of trauma
exposure increases (D'Andrea, Pole, DePierro, Freed, & Wallace, 2013). Some therapies for
traumatic stress include practice identifying somatic markers of emotion to facilitate the experience
and processing of emotion (Rothschild, 2000). Building on these observations, long-term, but nontraumatic, stressors such as life events may illustrate more accurately the effects environmental
stressors have on IA outside of the bias that short-term experimental interventions have by
increasing heart rate and self-oriented attention.
Stress and Decision-Making
Stress in general has been shown to have a negative impact on decision-making, and there
are several factors that are hypothesized to contribute to this effect (Preston et al., 2007; Starcke &
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Brand, 2012). Stress has been shown to impair decision-making by increasing the likelihood that a
choice is made before all alternatives are considered (Keinan, 1987). Some researchers have
hypothesized that this effect is driven in part by stressful events requiring attentional resources
(Klein & Boals, 2001). By this hypothesis internalized representations of the stressor occupy
attentional resources relative to their emotional salience, leaving less attentional resources available
for other tasks (Klein &Boals, 2001). Stress inductions, such as the anticipation of public speaking,
have been shown to result in more risky and fewer safe choices when compared to control groups
(Starcke, Wolf, Markowitsch, & Brand, 2008). In a study by Starcke and colleagues (2008) levels of
salivary cortisol were correlated with the amount of risky choosing on a dice-based gambling task.
Administration of cortisol, using oral capsules, was shown in one study to increase risky choosing
compared to controls, particularly when the potential rewards were higher (Putman, Antypa
Crysovergi, & van der Does, 2010). This corroborates other studies have suggested that stress
increases reward sensitivity, and thus likelihood of choosing based on immediate gratification
(Starcke & Brand, 2012; Oliver, Wardle, & Gibson, 2000). Some studies have also shown a gender
effect on how stress effects decision-making, where men showed an increase in risky decisionmaking while under stress whereas women decreased their risky decision-making (Lighthall, Mather,
& Gorlick, 2009; Preston et al., 2007; van den Bos, Harteveld, & Stoop, 2009).
Whether there is a direct negative influence of stress from life events on decision-making has
been debated (Baradell & Klein, 1993; Starcke & Brand, 2012). However, life event stress has been
shown to reduce working memory (Klein & Boals, 2001). Reductions in working memory have been
shown to negatively impact decision-making during risk (Cui, Wang, Shi, Liu, Chen, & Chen, 2015).
While the direct effect has been debated, life event stress would increase stress overall which has
been shown to impair decision-making (Starcke et al., 2008), and decision-making during risk (Miu et
al., 2008).
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A previous analysis attempted to determine how life event stress affected the relationship
between autonomic arousal and learning to avoid risk (Nicholson, Birk, & Bonanno, 2017). Building
on prior research (Bechara et al., 1997; Bechara, 2004) the presence of autonomic arousal predicted
subjects’ ability to learn to avoid risk, but this relationship did not hold true for subjects who
reported greater amounts of life stress (Nicholson et al., 2017). Among subjects who reported less
negative and more positive life events in the previous four months on the Life Experiences Survey
(LES; Sarason, Johnson, & Siegel, 1978) showed a relationship where greater autonomic arousal
before making risky choices on the IGT predicted faster learning to avoid risk (Nicholson et al.,
2017). However, subjects who reported more negative life events in the previous four months, and
only this group, showed no significant relationship between their level of autonomic arousal prior to
making risky choices and learning to avoid risk. Life event stress moderated the relationship between
arousal and implicitly learning to avoid risk, as shown in Fig. 1. Those who experienced more
positive life events had the strongest relationship between arousal levels and rate of learning to avoid
risk, and those with more negative life events showed no relationship between arousal and learning
to avoid risk (Nicholson et al., 2017).
At present, how non-pathologic life event stress affects decision-making during risk remains
unknown. Stress has been shown to negatively affect decision-making (Starcke & Brand, 2012) and
decision-making during risk in particular (Miu et al., 2008; Preston et al., 2007). Perception of
somatic markers of arousal, even when outside of conscious awareness but recognized by regions of
the brain that integrate afferent somatic information, is believed to be a necessary component in the
relationship between autonomic arousal and learning to avoid risk in tasks like the IGT (Werner et
al., 2013). Those with higher IA as measured by accurate perception of cardiac signals have been
shown to avoid risk more overall than those with lower cardiac perception (Werner et al., 2009). The
next step in this line of research is to determine if stress affects decision-making by reducing IA. If
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so this could be done either implicitly, by affecting sensitivity to somatic markers of arousal, or
explicitly, by focusing attention on stress-relevant data to the exclusion of somatic feedback. Either
or both of these could cause life event stress to impede the relationship typically seen between
autonomic arousal and implicitly learning to avoid risk.
The Present Study
The present study aimed to address this knowledge gap by examining the impact of external
and non-acute stress on the use of IA in learning to avoid risk. It was hypothesized that 1) subjects
with more self-reported life event stress would have lower scores of IA compared to subjects with
less life event stress, 2) compared to subjects with lower IA scores, those with higher IA would
show faster rates of learning on the IGT, 3) IA scores would moderate the relationship between
autonomic arousal and rate of learning, and 4) life event stress would moderate the capacity for IA
to moderate autonomic arousal and learning to avoid risk, as shown in Fig. 2.
Method
This is a secondary analysis of a previously completed study conducted at Teacher’s College,
Columbia University. Reporting of the primary findings is still in progress. Post hoc analysis of the
de-identified data was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the City College of New York.
Participants
A community sample of 96 healthy adults responded to advertisements online and were
compensated financially for participation. Four subjects fell asleep during the tasks and were
removed from analysis. Subsequently after missing data and outliers were removed there were a total
of 86 (54 females; Mage = 27.55 years; SDage = 6.56 years) subjects who were used in this analysis.
Reasons for their removal from analysis are discussed in more detail below. The racial makeup of
the group was 35% Asian, 26% Black, 35% White, 1% identified as multi-racial, and 4% chose not
to identify. Subjects who identified as Hispanic or Latino comprised 15% of the sample, and 2%
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chose not to answer this question. Before data collection all study procedures were approved by the
Institutional Review Board of Teacher’s College, Columbia University. All subjects gave their written
informed consent prior to beginning the study.
Physiological Recordings
After giving their informed consent subjects had sensors attached to them to collect
physiological data. Electrocardiography and electrodermal activity was recorded using a wireless
BioPac MP150 unit (BioPac, Goleta, CA) and the AcqKnowledge 4.3.1 program. For each of the
two physiological channels a small BioNomadix transmitter was secured to the subject with Velcro
straps. Wires ran from this transmitter to the electrodes held against the subjects’ skin with adhesive.
Data from each channel was recorded at a sampling rate of 1000 Hz and transmitted wirelessly to
the BioPac MP150 unit behind a screen several feet away. Two subjects had faulty SCL data and
were not used in the analyses.
To measure electrocardiographic data (ECG) three Ag/AgCl electrodes were placed on the
participants’ front torso: below the clavicle and slightly to the center of the deltoid muscle on either
side, and one in line with the navel but beneath the subject’s left ribs. Each electrode had a 1 cm
diameter contact point that was pre-gelled with a 7% chloride gel. After the experiment this data was
downsampled to 400 Hz. Heart rate was then calculated by identifying R-spikes using ANSLAB, a
suite of open-source Matlab routines used for analyzing physiological data (Wilhelm & Peyk, 2005),
followed by final visual inspection by a trained research assistant to correct any artifacts.
Changes in skin conductance level (SCL) were measured in microSiemens (𝜇S) as a reliable
indicator of autonomic activation (Dawson et al., 2007). After cleaning the area with a disposable
pre-moistened wipe, two Ag/AgCl electrodes, pre-gelled with 0.5% chloride isotonic gel, were
attached to the base of the palm on the subject’s non-dominant hand. Prior to each task the
electrode clips were detached from the electrodermal electrode stickers to establish a baseline of 0-
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S. After the experiment this data was downsampled to 10 Hz, and linearly de-trended on a trial-bytrial basis.
Before beginning the tasks, a trained research assistant would inspect the physiological data
in real time using the AcqKnowledge program to confirm a clear signal.
Behavioral Tasks
Mental Tracking Method. To measure IA researchers used the MTM, developed by
Schandry (1981). Participants were seated in front of a computer and asked to count their heartbeats
silently without taking their pulse or holding their breath. A sound cue indicated when they were to
start counting, and a different sound cue indicated when to stop. After each counting phase subjects
entered the number of heartbeats they counted on the computer. There were three counting phases
of different lengths: 25, 35, & 45 seconds, with a 30 second resting period between each counting
phase. The order that the counting phases were presented in was randomized. IA was calculated
using the following equation:
/3 (1-(recorded heartbeats – counted heartbeats)/recorded heartbeats).

1

Three subjects did not enter an answer for 1 or more trials of the MTM and were thus not included
in the analyses.
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). A computerized version of the standardized IGT (Bechara et
al., 1997) was administered. Subjects were given instructions that on each trial they were to choose
one of four decks of cards, each labeled A, B, C, or D. Subjects started the task with $2000 of
facsimile money and instructed to maximize their earnings. They were also reminded the money was
fake and their final amount at the end of the task would have no bearing on their financial
compensation for participating in the study. Before each trial was a 3-second anticipation screen,
wherein the subject could see the cards they would be choosing from and their current score but
they could not yet make a choice. After 3-seconds the subject was permitted to make a choice during
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the choice screen, indicated by a change in background color, and this screen was presented until the
subject made a choice of one of the four decks. When two of the decks, C & D, would receive larger
immediate rewards (eg. $100 or $150) but would sporadically also receive a large penalty (eg. $1250)
such that over time choosing from these decks resulted in a net loss. These decks were considered
risky. When choosing the other two decks, A & B, subjects would receive smaller immediate rewards
(eg. $25 or $50) but also much smaller, albeit more regular, penalties (eg. $0 or $50), so that
choosing from these decks repeatedly resulted in a net gain. This task was administered for 100
trials.
In keeping with prior analyses (Bechara & Martin, 2004; Werner et al., 2013) a score to
determine smart choosing was calculated by first breaking the 100 trials into 5 blocks of 20 trials
each, and for each block of 20 trials subtracting the number of risky choices from the number of
safe choices [(A + B) – (C + D)]. Performance scores below zero indicate a greater number of risky
choices for that block, while scores above zero indicate a greater number of safe choices. Rates of
smart choosing for each block were then used to compute two more variables. For each subject the
smart choosing scores for each of the five blocks were averaged together to create an overall smart
choosing score. The slope of learning for each participant was computed as the slope of the line that
fit the five points representing safe choosing over the five blocks of the task. A larger slope means
the participant learned faster to choose the safe decks. One subject was removed from analysis due
to an extreme outlier score on this variable.
Questionnaires
After other experimental tasks, a series of pen-and-pencil questionnaires were completed by
participants.
Life Experiences Survey. The Life Experiences Survey (LES; Sarason et al., 1978) is a 50item questionnaire that lists a series of impactful life events, both positive and negative, and subjects
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were asked to indicate whether these events occurred to them in the previous four months. These
events included “marriage,” “death of a spouse,” “major change in sleeping habits,” “new job,” and
others. If the event had occurred to them the subject would indicate on a seven-point Likert scale
their how positive or negative that experience was (-3 = extremely negative, -2 = moderately negative, -1 =
somewhat negative, 0 = no impact, +1 = slightly positive, +2 = moderately positive, +3 = extremely positive). The
final three questions are blank so subjects can include other major life events that are not listed and
indicate how these events impacted them. This questionnaire was chosen because it allows for a
delineation between the number of recent events and the intensity of their subjective impact,
without assuming that certain events would be either positive or negative. These scores were
calculated to determine what impact non-traumatic life event stressors, either in their number or
their cumulative subjective valence, may have on interoception and decision-making.
State Trait Anxiety Inventory. A subscale of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI;
Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970) was administered in hard-copy format along with the other
questionnaires. 20 of the 40 items of this self-report questionnaire was used to assess trait anxiety, or
more stable trends in one’s general anxiety levels (Spielberger et al., 1970). Subjects were given 20
statements and asked to respond on a 4-point Likert scale with the answer that best indicates how
they “generally feel,” (1 = almost never, 2 = sometimes, 3 = often, 4 = almost always).
Attentional Control Scale. To assess the impact that the capacity to selectively deploy
attention may have on the variables of interest a hard-copy version of the Attentional Control Scale
(Derryberry & Reed, 2002). This self-report questionnaire has 20 items that subjects respond to with
a 4-point Likert scale indicating the extent to which they agree with the statement (1 = almost never, 2
= sometimes, 3 = often, 4 = always). Of the 20 items, 11 are reverse-coded. This measure has been
shown to be reliably divided into 2 sub-scales, attentional focusing and attentional shifting
(Ólafsson, Smári, Guðmundsdóttir, Ólafsdóttir, Harðardóttir, & Einarsson, 2011). Attentional
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focusing is described as the ability to willfully maintain focus despite distraction and has shown a
negative relationship to anxiety symptoms (Ólafsson et al., 2011). Attentional shifting is described as
the ability to intentionally shift attention between competing stimuli and has shown a negative
relationship to symptoms of depression (Ólafsson et al., 2011).
Procedure
Subjects were recruited through flyers around the Columbia University campus and postings
on craigslist.com. As interoception is greatly impacted by psychiatric conditions only healthy
subjects with no history of psychopathology were used. When potential subjects called the lab they
were first given a brief phone screen to rule out those with serious physical health issues or a history
of psychopathology, and to confirm normal or corrected to normal eyesight. If they met screening
criteria subjects were scheduled to come in to the lab for the experiment. First the subjects gave
their written informed consent for the study. Then they were attached to the physiological
equipment as described above, with electrode stickers attached at three points on their torso to
collect ECG data and two electrode stickers on the palm of their non-dominant hand to collect SCL
data. Once accurate physiological signals were confirmed the subjects first performed the two
computer tasks: the MTM and the IGT. After these tasks and other tasks not relevant to this study
physiological sensors were removed, and the subjects completed printed versions of a demographic
questionnaire, the LES, the STAI, and the ACS. All data analyses were subsequently completed
using SPSS version 25.
Data Analysis
First each variable will be calculated and general trends assessed. A smart choosing score was
calculated for each block of the IGT by taking the total number of safe choices and subtracting the
total number of risky choices. These scores for each of the 5 blocks were then averaged together to
create an overall smart choosing score. A 5 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA was run with the factors
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of block (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) and deck type (safe, risky) to determine if there were statistically significant
changes in the patterns of choosing over the course of the IGT.
For each trial of the IGT, SCL was collected over a 3-second anticipation window prior to
each trial of the IGT was averaged to collect any anticipatory responses, see Fig. 3. These
anticipatory SCL scores were then averaged together for all trials where risky choices were made,
and all trials where safe choices were made to create average SCL scores prior to risky choices and
safe choices for each subject. These risky and safe SCL scores were then compared using paired
samples t-test. The difference between SCL prior to risky and safe trials was calculated for each
subject, to create a final SCL score.
To test the hypotheses that IA will be negatively correlated with LES appraisal scores and
positively correlated with smart choosing, a bivariate correlation was then run on all the variables of
interest. These included: IA scores, LES appraisal scores, the number of negative and positive events
reported on the LES, trait anxiety scores on the STAI, focusing and shifting subscales of the ACS,
average difference in SCL prior to choosing (bad minus good), overall smart choosing score, smart
choosing scores for each of the 5 blocks, and slope of learning.
Based on the correlations, a linear regression was run with the dependent variable of overall
smart choosing, and the independent variables IA, LES appraisal, and SCL. Given that the
dependent variables correlated with smart choosing scores differently depending on the block, this
linear regression was repeated with the same independent variables IA, LES appraisal, and SCL, but
with the dependent variables of smart choosing score for each of the 5 blocks. A linear regression
was also run with the dependent variable slope of learning, and the same independent variables IA,
LES appraisal, and SCL.
Expanding on previous studies LES appraisal scores were tested as a moderator of the
relationship between SCL and overall smart choosing, see Fig. 4, using the mathematical model and
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PROCESS macro for SPSS proposed by Hayes (2017). To test the hypothesis that IA would
moderate the relationship between autonomic arousal and learning to avoid risk, IA examined first
as a moderator of the relationship between SCL and overall smart choosing, see Fig. 5, then as
possibly moderating the relationship between SCL and slope of learning, see Fig. 6. Based on these
findings the hypothesized moderated moderation where LES appraisal scores would moderate IA’s
moderation of the relationship between SCL and smart choosing was not conducted.
Results
Decision-making performance
Behavioral performance on the IGT was calculated as the average number of safe and risky
choices for all participants across each of the 5 blocks of 20 trials, see Fig. 7. A 5 x 2 repeatedmeasures ANOVA with the factors of block (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) by deck type (safe, risky) showed no
significant effect for choice (p=.117), but a significant interaction for choice x block, F(4, 340)=
5.868, p < .001, 2 = .065. This indicates that while subjects did not choose either deck more overall
(p=.117), they learned to choose the safe decks more often as the blocks progressed (p<.001), see
Fig. 8. A paired-samples t-test comparing safe (A & B) and risky (C & D) choices for each block
showed significant differences only on Block 1 where subjects chose risky decks (M=11.56,
SD=2.88) more than safe decks (M=8.44, SD=2.88), t(85)= -5.02, p < .001, and for Block 2 where
risky deck choices (M=11.26, SD=3.94) outnumbered safe deck choices (M=8.74, SD=3.94),
t(85)=-2.95, p=.004. The number of risky versus safe deck choices was not statistically significant for
Block 3, p=.355, Block 4, p=.588, or Block 5, p=.718.
Smart choosing scores were calculated each block by subtracting the number of risky choices
from the number of safe choices. An overall smart choosing score was calculated for each subject by
averaging their smart choosing scores for each block. These scores passed the Shapiro-Wilk test of
normal distribution (p=.236) and showed no differences by gender, p= .80.
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Slope of learning scores for each participant were computed using the five points
representing safe choosing over the five blocks of the task and calculating the slope of the line that
connects those five points. A larger slope means the participant learned faster to choose the safe
decks. Slope of learning scores did not pass the Shapiro-Wilk test of normal distribution (p= .027),
but showed no differences between genders, p=.773.
Skin conductance level
Before each trial of the IGT was a 3-second anticipation period where the subject could see
4 decks of cards but could not yet make a choice. SCL data collected during this anticipation period
was averaged for each trial. A paired samples t-test comparing the averaged SCL for all participants
prior to safe deck choices (M=5.09, SD=5.17) and risky deck choices (M=5.15, SD=5.15) were not
significant, p=.245. To capture differences in the elevation of SCL prior to risky choices compared
to that of safe choices, for each subject their average SCL prior to making safe choices was
subtracted from their average SCL prior to risky choices. This final SCL score did not pass tests for
normal distribution (p<.001), and showed no gender differences, p=.225. While outliers for this
score were present, they represented accurate physiological response data so no changes were made
to the SCL scores.
Interoceptive Awareness
IA scores were calculated using the standard scoring method for the MTM (Schandry, 1981).
Two values were removed due to being outliers. After these corrections IA scores passed the
Shapiro-Wilk test of normal distribution (p=.938) and showed no difference between genders,
p=.214. In accordance with the previous studies (Pollatos, Kirsch, & Schandry, 2005; Werner et al.,
2009) a cut-off score of 0.85 to assign participants to either high ( .85) or low (.85) groups was
considered. However, only 3 subjects met criteria for the high IA group, so the raw scores were used
in all subsequent calculations including IA.
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Life Experiences Survey
LES responses were calculated to assess the number of negative events, the number of
positive events, and the sum of the subjective appraisals for all events that had occurred to each
subject. In the 4 months prior to the study 78 subjects reported experiencing positive events
(Mpos=5.10, SDpos=3.38), and 79 subjects reported negative events in the prior 4 months (Mneg=4.09,
SDneg=2.91). All subjects had their subjective appraisals for all events added together to create a LES
appraisal variable, which passed Shapiro-Wilk test for normal distribution (p=.362) and was not
significantly different between genders, p=.443. Based on previous research (Clements & Turpin,
2000) LES appraisal scores were compared in a bivariate correlation to raw SCL levels prior to safe
choices (p=.552), prior to risky choices (p=.541), and the difference in SCL between risky and safe
choices (p=.875), and no relationship was found between these scores.
State Trait Anxiety Inventory
Scores for the STAI’s trait anxiety subscale were collected to assess levels of trait anxiety in
the subjects. Scores did not pass the Shapiro-Wilk test of normal distribution (p=.045) and were not
significantly different between genders, p=.268.
Attentional Control Scale
Subscales of the ACS, focusing and shifting, were calculated from the subject responses.
Both ACS focusing (p=.312) and ACS shifting (p=.120) passed the Shapiro-Wilk test for normal
distribution and neither showed gender differences, ps >.100.
Aim 1. Is interoceptive awareness affected by life event stress?
The first hypothesis, that IA would be affected by life event stress, was disconfirmed by the
results. A correlation analysis showed no relationship between IA as measured by the MTM and life
event stress as measured by scores on the LES.
Aim 2. Does interoceptive awareness impact the rate of implicit learning?
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The second hypothesis, that those with higher IA would show faster rates of learning on the
IGT, was disconfirmed. Correlation analysis showed no relationship between scores for IA and
slope of learning. Multiple regression analysis also confirmed IA scores did not predict slope of
learning, as is detailed below.
A series of bivariate correlations were conducted to explore any possible relationships
between all the variables of interest: age, education level, IA, overall smart choosing, slope of
learning, SCL (risky minus safe), the number of positive events reported on the LES, the number of
negative events reported on the LES, LES appraisal scores, STAI trait anxiety, ACS focusing, and
ACS shifting, see Table 1. Using a Pearson correlation age was significantly correlated with
education, r(86)=.282, p=.008, and negatively correlated with IA, r(86)=-.285, p=.008. Education
was also correlated with ACS focusing scores, r(86)=-.241, p=.026. In addition to age, IA was
significantly correlated to overall smart choosing but in the opposite direction as anticipated, r(86)=.259, p=.016, see Fig. 9. IA was also correlated to ACS shifting scores r(86)=-.249, p=.021, and no
other variables. smart choosing overall was also correlated with slope of learning, r(86)=.474,
p<.001, and SCL, r(86)=.375, p<.001. SCL during the 3 second anticipation period, using the
difference between the average of SCL prior to risky choices minus the average prior to safe choices,
was positively correlated to overall smart choosing, r(86)=.375, p<.001; slope of learning, r(86)=.363,
p=.001; and ACS focusing scores r(86)=.231, p=.032. LES appraisal scores were positively correlated
with the number positive life events, r(86)=.706, p<.001, and negatively correlated with negative life
events, r(86)=-.672, p<.001. Trait anxiety scores on the STAI were positively correlated with the
number of negative life events on the LES, r(86)=.374, p<.001; negatively correlated with LES
appraisal scores, r(86)=-.338, p=.001; ACS focusing scores, r(86)=-.364, p=.001; and ACS shifting
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scores, r(86)=-.360, p=.001. ACS scores, focusing and shifting, were positively correlated with each
other, r(86)=.633, p<.001.
An exploratory inspection of the various blocks of the IGT revealed that these relationships
between smart choosing and the variables of interest varied over the course of the 100 trials of the
IGT, see Table 2. During the first 20 trials of the IGT, Block 1, a Pearson correlation showed smart
choosing1 was not significantly related to IA, p=.094, or SCL, p=.552, but was significantly
correlated with LES appraisal scores, r(86)=.276, p=.010. In Block 2 smart choosing2 was not
related to SCL, p=.331, or LES appraisal, p=.621, but was significantly correlated with IA, r(86)=.294, p=.006. In Block 3 smart choosing3 was related to IA, r(86)=-.224, p=.038, and SCL,
r(86)=.351, p=.001. SCL was related to smart choosing in Block 4, r(86)=.462, p<.001, and Block 5,
r(86)=.324, p=.002. ACS focusing scores were related to smart choosing in Block 4, r(86)=.226,
p=.028, and no other variables were related to the individual blocks of smart choosing.
Since age, the number of positive or negative events reported on the LES, trait anxiety, or
the ACS variables were not significantly related to either overall smart choosing or slope of learning
they were not included in the subsequent analyses.
A standard multiple regression analysis was performed between the dependent variable
(smart choosing) and the independent variables (IA, SCL, LES appraisal). The results were tested
using a bootstrap estimation approach with 1000 samples. Regression analysis revealed the model
significantly predicted smart choosing, F(3, 82)=6.744, p<.001. R2=.198. Of the individual variables
IA (=-.234, p=.020), and SCL (=.360, p<.001), both significantly predicted overall smart
choosing. LES appraisal scores, however, were not significant predictors in this model, p=.678.
Based on the correlational findings that the independent variables expressed different levels
of influence on the dependent variable at different stages of the task, the previous regression analysis
was repeated for each of the 5 blocks of 20 trials of the IGT, see Table 3. For Block 1, the
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regression model significantly predicted smart choosing1, F(3, 82)=3.313, p=.023, R2=.108. Of the
variables influencing smart choosing1 IA (p=.109) and SCL (p=.637) were not significant predictors
but LES appraisal scores were significant (=.269, p=.012). For Block 2, the same regression model
was significant, F(3, 82)=2.897, p=.040, R2=.096, with only IA predicting smart choosing2 (=-.287,
p=.008). For Block 3, the model was significant, F(3, 82)=5.420, p=.002, R2=.165. SCL was
significant in predicting smart choosing3, (=.338, p=.001) as was IA, (=-.204, p=.047), whereas
LES appraisal was not (p=.698). For Block 4 the model was significant, F(3, 82)=7.946, p<.001,
R2=.225, with smart choosing4 significantly predicted by SCL (=.455, p<.001), while IA and LES
appraisal were not (ps >.276). For Block 5 the model was significant, F(3, 82)=3.979, p=.011,
R2=.127, with only SCL significantly predicting smart choosing5 (=.305, p=.003), while IA and
LES appraisal did not (ps >.155) did not. Taken together IA, LES appraisal, and SCL impacted
smart choosing differently at different points in the task. In Block 1 LES was related to smart
choosing. In Block 2 IA was negatively related to smart choosing. In Block 3 both IA and SCL
predicted smart choosing, and in Blocks 4 and 5 SCL predicted smart choosing.
A multiple regression analysis was performed between the dependent variable slope of
learning and the independent variables LES appraisal, IA, and SCL. Results were tested using a
bootstrap estimation with 1000 samples. The model significantly predicted slope of learning F(3,
82)= 4.952, p=.003. R2=.153. Of the independent variables only SCL significantly predicted slope of
learning (=.365, p=.001), while LES appraisals and IA were not significant predictors (ps>.150).
Based on previous findings (Nicholson et al., 2017) a regression analysis was used to
investigate whether LES appraisal scores conditionally moderated the ability of SCL scores to
predict overall smart choosing. IA was entered as a covariate since it has been shown to be related to
the dependent variable. Predictor variables were centered on the mean. The results were tested using
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a bootstrap estimation approach with 5000 samples (Shrout & Bolger, 2002). Overall the model was
significant, F(4, 81) =4.997, p =.001, R2=.198. The interaction between SCL and LES appraisal
scores was not significant in accounting for a portion of the variance, R2 <.001, F(1, 81)=.003,
p=.960, indicating LES appraisal scores do not conditionally moderate the relationship between SCL
and overall smart choosing.
Aim 3. Does interoceptive awareness moderate the use of internal feedback in decisionmaking?
This hypothesis was also disconfirmed. Scores for IA were shown to not moderate the
relationship between SCL and the overall avoidance of risk, as measured by overall smart choosing,
Fig. 5, or the rate at which subjects learned to avoid risk, as measured by slope of learning, Fig. 6.
A regression analysis was used to further investigate the hypothesis that IA may moderate
the relationship between SCL and overall smart choosing. Predictor variables were again centered on
the mean, and results were tested using a bootstrap estimation approach with 5000 samples. The
model was significant, F(3, 82) =7.213, p <.001, R2=.209. However, the interaction was not
significant, R2 =.013, F(1, 82)=1.304, p=.257, indicating that IA does not moderate the relationship
between SCL and overall smart choosing.
Furthermore, IA did not moderate the relationship between SCL and the slope of learning
for the gambling task. A regression analysis was used to determine if IA moderated the ability of the
dependent variable SCL to predict slope of learning. IA and SCL were centered on the mean, and
results were tested with a bootstrap estimation with 5000 samples. Overall the model was significant,
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F(3, 82)=4.368, p=.007, R2=.138. However, the interaction was not significant, R2=.006, F(1,
82)=.594, p=.443, confirming that IA did not moderate the slope of learning for the gambling task.
Aim 4. Does life event stress moderate the ability of IA to moderate the use of internal
feedback to inform decision-making?
Since IA did not moderate the relationship between SCL and overall smart choosing or
between SCL and slope of learning a moderated moderation predicting either variable, Fig. 2, was
not considered.
Discussion
This study aimed to illustrate the role that interoception plays in decision-making; whether
changes interoception have an effect on the use of internal feedback and if the conditional effects of
external stress on internal feedback is due to a disruption of interoception. There is a dearth of
studies that have looked at the role of interoception in decision-making, and the results have thus far
been unclear (Werner et al., 2009; Werner et al., 2013). In the present study IA was shown to be
negatively correlated to the overall choosing of more safe, as opposed to risky, decks on a gambling
task. Regression analyses showed that increased SCL prior to risky choices compared to safe choices
predicted overall smart choosing, making more safe than risky choices. Scores of the MTM did not
moderate the relationship between SCL and overall smart choosing, or the relationship between SCL
and the rate of learning ot avoid risk. Breaking the 100 trials of the gambling task into 5 blocks of 20
showed that the life event stress only had a negative influence on smart choosing during the first
block, and the inverse relationship between IA as measured by the MTM was limited to blocks 2 and
3. For the final 3 blocks increased autonomic arousal prior to risky compared to safe choices
predicted overall avoidance of risky choices.
Findings did not support the a priori hypotheses. IA, as measured by scores on the MTM,
was not affected by different levels of life event stress prior to the experiment. IA showed no
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relationship to slope of learning. The relationship between IA and smart choosing was in the
opposite direction as expected, and driven by blocks 2 and 3 of the 5-block task. Furthermore, IA
did not moderate the relationship between autonomic arousal, as measured by SCL, and either
overall smart choosing or the slope of learning.
These findings could be in part the result of scores on the MTM being an effective measure
for interoceptive accuracy specific to cardiac information, but not an effective proxy for sensitivity
to the holistic range of internal feedback that is interoceptive awareness. MTM scores were
negatively associated with smart choosing, and for only 2 out of 5 blocks of the IGT. Also, MTM
scores were not related to either SCL reactions to risk, the slope of learning to avoid risk, or the
relationship between those 2 factors. Together, these points support the notion that that scores on
the MTM were not related to sensitivity to, or the use of, internal feedback as measured by SCL.
Without a measure of IA that uses the same physiological channel that is being used to assess
autonomic arousal, the hypotheses of this study remain unclear.
The findings of this study do point to at least two important possibilities. First, regression
analyses showed that the negative influence of MTM and LES scores on learning to avoid risk were
specific to certain time periods over the course of the 100 trials, indicating a possible temporal
dynamic to their influence. Second, though commonly used as a proxy for IA, scores on the MTM
were not related to internal feedback outside of heart rate or its use in decision-making, indicating
this measure is not actually measuring IA but sensitivity to changes in heart rate.
The findings of the present study could corroborate previous research showing that stress
can impair decision-making, but interpretation of the findings requires taking into consideration the
specifics of the task. In this study higher life event stress predicted more risky choosing, but only for
the first 20 trials of the task. These findings could have been pure chance and would not be present
upon future replications of the study. However, as other researchers have pointed out (Maia &
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McClelland, 2004) a choice can only be considered risky once the subject has experienced a loss
associated with that choice that could outweigh the potential gains. Following the guidelines put
forward by Bechara (1997) all decks had a set pattern of when they would provide wins and losses.
Each risky deck did not incur penalties until the 10th time that deck was chosen. From the subject’s
perspective up until that point those decks were more advantageous. Given the first block consisted
of 20 trials, it is unlikely any subject would incur more than one penalty in this time. As such the
observed relationship could be a function of stress increasing reward sensitivity, and thus the
likelihood of choosing greater short-term rewards, a phenomenon that has been observed in other
research (Starcke & Brand, 2012; Starcke, Wolf, Markowitsch, & Brand, 2008).
Other research has found that increased life event stress, even in only the previous 4
months, can reduce autonomic reactivity to stress-inducing cognitive tasks (Clements & Turpin,
2000). In the present study an ANOVA confirmed that there were no between-groups differences in
SCL based on LES scores, p=.104. There could, however, be within-groups differences wherein
those with higher life event stress have lower autonomic reactivity than they typically have had at
other points in their lives, but this possibility was not directly tested in the study.
In the present study regression analyses showed that increased sensitivity to cardiac
information as measured by the MTM negatively predicted smart choosing, and had the strongest
impact in blocks 2 and 3. This implies that sensitivity to cardiac information may distract from
decision-making. It could be that the observed temporal dynamic was the product of pure chance
and these findings would not be replicated in future administrations of the study. It could be that
increased sensitivity to cardiac reactions to the gains and losses of the task increased the likelihood
that these cardiac reactions entered into consciousness, becoming a distraction and promoting
poorer performance. As the task progressed and subjects became both better at the task and more
habituated to both wins and losses, together this could lead to lower cardiac reactivity to be
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distracted by as the task progressed. It could be that, as subjects progressed, significant negative
consequences were not incurred until blocks 2 and 3, wherein greater sensitivity to one’s own
reactions would be a distraction during that time. By blocks 4 and 5 subjects could have both
learned how to avoid these negative consequences and were more habituated to game overall,
meaning that there was less cardiac reactivity to be distracted by.
Another possible explanation for the negative relationship between scores on the MTM and
smart choosing involves the concept of psychological inflexibility (Bond, Hayes, Baer, Carpenter,
Guenole, & Zettle, 2011). Higher IA has been shown to be associated with some psychopathologies,
particularly those related to anxiety (Ehlers & Breuer, 1992; Sturges & Goetsch, 1996), and in this
study higher IA was negatively correlated with self-reported ability to shift attention when necessary.
It is possible that those with higher IA were also more rigid in their choosing strategies, continuing
to choose the risky decks longer before deciding the short-term benefits did not outweigh the
occasional losses. The temporal specificity of this effect, blocks 2 and 3, could be a result of those
with higher IA showing greater psychological inflexibility and continuing to make poor choices
longer, whereas those with lower IA scores began to make more safe choices during this period.
However, there was no screening for psychopathology or measure of psychological inflexibility so
this possible explanation could not be tested.
Since the relationship between physiological arousal, as measured by SCL, and learning to
avoid risk was not related to IA scores this implies that the cardiac sensitivity as measured by the
MTM is not a reliable marker of interoceptive ability in general. This has been suggested before
(Khalsa et al., 2008; Ceunen et al., 2013) and there are several reasons why this may be the case.
Importantly the MTM is a behavioral task that uses explicit attention to measure what is typically an
implicit process. Somatic markers influence emotional states and decision-making most often
without explicit conscious recognition of the specific physiological changes (Damasio, 1994; Barrett,
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2017; Bechara et al., 1997). Elevations in SCL which predicted the likelihood of learning to avoid
risk in this and previous studies (Bechara et al., 1997) is entirely outside of conscious control or
perception. Another reason why the MTM may not be an effective proxy for interoception is that
the task measures sensitivity to one physiological channel, heart rate, whereas multiple physiological
channels from the body are constantly being integrated to produce an overall subjective sense of
self. While the MTM is an effective measure of interoceptive accuracy, which is a component of IA,
there is reason to believe this measure alone may not be an effective proxy for IA as a whole.
Research Implications
The results of this study are at odds with previous research which has shown scores on the
MTM being associated with improved performance on the IGT (Werner et al., 2009). There may be
several reasons for this. Firstly, the prior study conducted a between groups analysis with their
sample evenly divided between those with good or bad IA. Following pre-exiting guidelines
(Schandry, Sparrer, & Weitkunat, 1986; Pollatos et al., 2005) a cut off score of 0.85 was used and
those with scores above 0.85 were sorted into the good IA group (N=25) and those with scores
below were sorted into the bad IA group(N=25). In the present study only 3 subjects scored above
0.85 on the MTM. Regression analyses used in the current study, while divergent from prior
findings, may paint a clearer picture of the effect different MTM scores have on decision-making
compared to a binary between-groups analysis. In the previous study (Werner et al., 2009) subjects
learned to avoid the risky decks faster, with a greater number of safe choices that became significant
starting in Block 3. In the present study subjects chose more safe decks over time but the difference
in choices wasn’t significant. Werner and colleagues used a sample of N=50, where 49 of the
subjects were university students and 1 was a university employee. The present study used a sample
that was larger, N=86, and older, M=27.5 years, where only 25% were undergraduate students, and
40% were employed full time, none at the university. Though contrary to previous research the
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larger and more diverse sample of the present study may imply greater generalizability to the
population at large.
The findings of this study support previous research indicating that the MTM may not be an
appropriate measure for interoception in general. Other researchers have noted that the MTM
measures interoceptive accuracy, which is a component of IA but does not directly imply sensitivity
to other types of somatic information (Calì et al., 2015; Ceunen et al., 2013; Garfinkel et al., 2015).
The MTM has also, in some studies, shown no relationship to other measures of interoceptive
accuracy (Schulz et al., 2013; Phillips, Jones, Rieger, & Snell, 1999; Kleckner, Wormwood, Simmons,
Barrett, & Quigley, 2015) except in cases where subjects were either very good or very bad at
heartbeat detection (Knoll, & Hodapp, 1992). While accuracy in heartbeat detection may be a byproduct of increased IA, there are many factors that can influence MTM scores that do not
necessarily generalize to sensitivity to, or use of, other somatic information (Brener & Ring, 2016;
Murphy et al., 2018). Elevated blood pressure, or hypertension, has been linked to increased
heartbeat perception (O'Brien, Reid, & Jones, 1998; Koroboki, Zakopoulos, Manios, Rotas,
Papadimitriou, & Papageorgiou, 2010). Lower Body Mass Index (BMI) has been linked to improved
scores on the HDT (Rouse, Jones, & Jones, 1988). Knowledge about standard resting heart rate has
also shown to be a potential confound that should be accounted for when using the MTM (Brener
& Ring, 2016; Murphy et al., 2018). These findings, along with the findings of this study which
showed no relationship between MTM scores and the use of internal feedback, imply that the MTM
may not have adequate construct validity to be used as a measure of IA without other corroborating
measures.
Also of note is the temporal specificity of the relationship between SCL and smart choosing.
In this study regression analyses showed that elevations in SCL specific to risky choosing only
predicted smart choosing in the second half of the 100 trials. If this pattern persists when replicated
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by future studies, this could help refine analysis by focusing only on the second half of trials when
the effect was likely to take place.
Clinical Implications
Potentially relevant to future clinical research is the timing of the influence that MTM scores
or life event stress. While both life event stress and likelihood of noticing cardiac information
negatively impacted learning to avoid risk on the IGT, these effects were only present for the first
half of the 100 trials. In regression analyses the effects of both variables were absent for the final 40
trials of the task. This implies that while life event stress and sensitivity to cardiac data can impede
task performance, or implicit learning in particular, these effects may be temporary and diminish
over time as the task is continued. With respect to decision-making and risk, this implies that
decisions made quickly are most likely to be negatively influenced by life event stress or sensitivity to
cardiac arousal data, but given more time the influence of these factors diminishes and internal
feedback is better able to guide decision-making. This is not unlike how some substance abuse
treatments (McCauley, Killeen, Gros, Brady, & Back, 2012) encourage patients to “ride the wave” of
their urges to use; researchers have found that if patients can get through a few minutes without
acting on their impulse to use the physical urges then subside and they are thereafter in a better
position to decide what to do next. Similarly, when making decisions riding out the initial reactions,
wherein choices are more likely to be negatively influenced, can lead to better decision making. This
approach could have an impact on studies involving any group at greater risk for risky decisionmaking, such as those with substance abuse disorders (Bechara & Martin, 2004) or major depression
(Furman et al., 2013).
Limitations
This study had several strengths and weaknesses that warrant mentioning. Firstly, a total of
96 subjects were initially recruited, with 86 who could be used for this study, which is nearly double
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other similar studies (Ainley & Tsakiris, 2013; Preston et al., 2007), and efforts were made to recruit
a representative community sample. This may then give this study greater generalizability than other
studies whose populations are more homogenous regarding age (Miu et al., 2008), or education
levels (Werner et al., 2009). However, this study had no screening for psychopathology. Subjects
were briefly interviewed over the phone and the screening for pathology consisted of asking each
subject if they had ever received a psychiatric diagnosis. As such, it is possible that some pathology
was present in the sample which would skew the results. Even at sub-clinical levels, factors such as
psychological inflexibility, depression, or anxiety could conceivably influence both interoception or
risk assessment. As a secondary analysis of existing data there was minimal control over design or
methodology.
An exploratory analysis showed that the independent variables each significantly predicted
the dependent variable smart choosing at different stages of the task. This could imply that different
factors which affect decision-making do so with different levels of influence at different times the
longer that a task is maintained. Or these block specific relationships could have been the product of
pure chance and would not be present in a repetition of the study.
What is both a limitation and an opportunity of this study is that MTM scores used as a
proxy for IA showed no relationship to the availability of somatic feedback, as measured by changes
in SCL prior to risk, or the use of somatic feedback, as measured by slope of learning. The MTM, an
explicit one-channel behavioral task, does not appear to measure IA, an implicit multi-channel
process. As such, the central hypotheses of this study remain unanswered. Increases in physiological
arousal before risk predicted learning to avoid risk, but whether this relationship is affected by
differences in IA remains unclear.
While possibly not an appropriate measure of IA, researchers have found useful covariates
that increase reliability of the MTM. Murphy and colleagues (2018) found that incorporating a
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question about knowledge of the average heart rate, and a counting task similar to the MTM,
controlled for enough of the variance in scores to make the relationship between the MTM and
scores on the Toronto Alexithymia Scale statistically significant. While the MTM may not be well
suited for measuring IA in general, taking these measures into account can help for researchers who
wish to use this measure to assess the accuracy and likelihood of changes in heart rate being noticed.
This could be of great use for research with populations such as those at risk for panic or anxiety
attacks or heart attack survivors. Future research into IA could include the MTM with these
covariates in addition to other measures of IA, such as the MAIA (Mehling, et al., 2012), to acquire a
more holistic sense of the sensitivity to internal feedback.
The relationship between autonomic arousal and learning to avoid risk is susceptible to
influence from recent life event stress (Nicholson et al., 2017). However, a person is at any moment
influenced by more than the events of the past few months. Events from throughout the lifespan
can impact variables relevant to this paradigm such as the availability of autonomic feedback
(McLaughlin, Sheridan, Alves, & Mendes, 2014), available attentional resources (Pechtel & Pizzagalli,
2011) or the interpretation of risk (McCrory, De Brito, Sebastian, Mechelli, Bird, Kelly, & Viding,
2011; McLaughlin et al., 2014; Pechtel & Pizzagalli, 2011). The influence of stressful events from
throughout the lifespan is unaccounted for in this study.
Future Directions
One of the more interesting and exploratory findings of this study was the temporal
specificity of the influence of the variables on smart choosing scores. This temporal specificity
should be considered in future research on decision-making to determine if these or other variables
exert their influence in a temporally dynamic manner or equally over the various trials of a decisionmaking task.
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Future research should expand the scope of life events that may affect decision-making.
Other measures such as the Stress and Adversity Inventory (Slavich & Epel, 2010) collect
information about serious events over the lifetime and could be used in conjunction with scales such
as the Life Events Checklist (Weathers, Blake, Schnurr, Kaloupek, Marx, & Keane, 2013) to gain a
more complete picture of stressful events that may be influencing relevant variables. Clinical studies
could incorporate data on life events and personal history from structured interviews like the SCID
(First & Williams, 2016). A wider focus of events that color a person’s interpretation of themselves
and the world may give a better sense of how life event stress impacts decision-making and the use
of internal feedback.
While life event stress moderates the relationship between physical arousal and the rate of
implicit learning, how this occurs is still not understood. One means that this effect could be taking
place is through a reduction in attentional resources. Differences in available attentional resources
could be assessed through a combined administration of the self-report Attentional Control Scale
(Derryberry & Reed, 2002) and a behavioral measure such as the Stroop color-word task (MacLeod,
1992). While the changes in internal feedback that guide decision-making are often outside of
conscious awareness, reductions in available attention could limit the influence of internal feedback
either by inhibiting resources available for the subconscious integration of afferent somatic signals
into a holistic sense of self, or by limiting the cognitive resources necessary for this holistic sense of
self to come into conscious awareness. Differentiating between interference at these levels of
processing would require neuro-imaging techniques.
Cortisol analysis may also give a more concrete view into how a participant’s myriad life
events are impacting their physical stress levels at the time of assessment. Regardless of the origin of
the stressor, or bias in the extent to which subjects are willing to admit events are bothering them,
analysis of salivary cortisol could provide an additional objective measure of stress to use in analysis.
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Comparisons between subjects at baseline could clarify the relationship between stress and the use
of internal feedback. In the initial study (Nicholson et al., 2017) the moderation was conditional:
once life event stress reached a certain level autonomic arousal stopped influencing decision-making.
Comparisons of salivary cortisol levels could help determine if and at what point baseline stress
reaches a certain level autonomic arousal stops predicting risk avoidance. A post-task cortisol sample
could further elucidate what effect stress responses to the task itself had on this relationship.
Neuro-imaging techniques could further elucidate precisely how those who are under more
life event stress react differently to risk. Groups that perform well on the IGT, compared to those
who do not, have shown different patterns of activation when at rest (Schutter & Van Honk, 2005),
larger P3 amplitudes in the left hemisphere prior to choice (Cui, Chen, Wang, Shum, & Chan, 2013),
and increased left hemisphere activation in response to losses (Balconi, Finocchiaro, Canavesio,
Messina, 2014). Like Bechara’s (1997) findings Werner and colleagues (2013) found differences in
brain activation prior to making risky choices specifically. Functional magnetic imaging showed
greater blood oxygen levels in the right anterior insula and left postcentral gyrus prior to risky
decisions but not prior to safe decision-making (Werner et al., 2013). While these findings showed
no relationship to self-reported state or trait anxiety, there is a dearth of research showing whether
differences in activation prior to risk are affected by life events. Future research could investigate
whether the different activation patterns associated with improved performance, or those found
prior to risky decision-making, are influenced by different levels of life event stress.
Future research into IA should consider that this is a multi-channel and implicit process and
should not be measured only using explicit prompts or sensitivity to just one physiological channel.
Incorporating the covariates mentioned by Murphy and colleagues (2018) would go a long way to
increasing the reliability of the MTM itself to assess cardiac accuracy. Other measures such as the
self-report MAIA (Mehling, et al., 2012) or other tasks that specifically measure the influence of
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sensitivity to somatic feedback, particularly changes that are outside of conscious awareness, may be
more appropriate for interpreting the in vivo sensitivity to internal feedback that is IA.
Electroencephalographic (EEG) measures of brain activity may be well suited to measuring
interoception as a whole. Since the process of interoception is done quickly and mostly out of
conscious awareness, differences in activation of brain regions associated with the integration of
afferent somatic information may be a useful indicator of interoceptive ability. The insula, and the
right insula in particular (Hassanpour, Simmons, Feinstein, Luo, Lapidus, Bodurka, Paulus, &
Khalsa, 2018), has been shown to be a key region for the integration of affective components
(Berntson, Norman, Bechara, Tranel, Bruss, & Cacioppo, 2011) and afferent somatic information
(Hassanpour et al., 2016) into a unified sense of interoception. This region has also been shown to
be more responsive in those who learned to avoid risk on the IGT (Rudorf, Preuschoff, & Weber
2012) and may be involved in the use of internal feedback specifically since it has been shown to be
more active prior to risky choices compared to safe choices, with higher levels of activation
associated with more safe choices both in a decision-making task and in daily life (Paulus et al.,
2003). Life event stress may influence activation of this or other areas during decision-making that
involves risk. If life event stress influences the use of internal feedback by altering the interoceptive
process, there may be differences in the activation of the insula either at baseline or during different
phases of the IGT. No differences in insula activation between groups with different levels of stress
across the IGT would strongly imply that life event stress moderates the influence of internal
feedback without affecting interoception.
Conclusion
In the present study IA, as measured by the MTM, was not related either to life event stress
or rate of learning. Study findings suggest that different factors significantly impact decision-making
during risk at different times in the course of the task. The results revealed an initial sequence of
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negative influence that life event stress, then cardiac accuracy, had on making safe versus risky
choices. For the second half of the task increases in SCL specific to risk predicted safe versus risky
choosing. These results might imply that when outcomes are unclear there is a temporal dynamic
where certain factors, such as increased reward sensitivity due to life stress or sensitivity to
distraction from cardiac information, may initially impede decision-making. However, as time
progresses internal feedback plays a larger role in guiding decision-making, resulting in greater
likelihood of avoiding risk. Research into both improved measures of IA, and the interaction of IA
with life event stress, warrant future investigation.
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Table 1
Bivariate Correlations between Variables of Interest.

Table 1. A correlation matrix featuring all of the factors that were considered for analysis in this
study. Since age, education, the number of positive or negative events reported on the Life
Experiences Survey (LES), trait anxiety, or attentional control scores had no relationship to smart
choosing or slope of learning, they were excluded from subsequent analyses.
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Table 2
Correlations between Variables of Interest and Smart Choosing on Each Block of the IGT.

Table 2. Correlations between interoceptive awareness (IA), differences in skin conductance level
(risky minus safe)(SCL), the sum appraisals from the Life Experiences Survey (LES) and smart
choosing (safe minus risky choosing) on the 5 blocks of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). IA is
correlated with performance only during Blocks 2 & 3, LES during Block 1, and SCL during blocks
3, 4, and 5.
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Table 3
Differences in the Influence of Predictor Variables over the Course of the Iowa Gambling Task

Table 3. A multiple regression with the predictor variables interoceptive awareness (IA), differences
in skin conductance level (risky minus safe)(SCL), and sum appraisal scores from the Life
Experiences Survey (LES), was repeated with the dependent variable of smart choosing for each
block of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). The degree of influence of each variable on the dependent
variable changed over the course of the task.
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Figure 1. Findings from Nicholson, Birk, & Bonanno, 2017 Analysis.

Figure 1. In a previous analysis life event stress was shown to moderate the relationship between
autonomic arousal and learning to avoid risk using the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT).
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Figure 2. Hypothesized Interaction for this Study.

Figure 2. Building on previous findings, it is hypothesized that life event stress is moderating the
ability of interoceptive awareness to moderate the relationship between autonomic arousal and
implicit learning to avoid risk.
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Figure 3. Skin Conductance Level Recording Phase.

Figure 3. During each trial of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), there was an initial anticipation period
lasting 3 seconds wherein the participant could see the 4 card decks but could not yet make a choice.
Skin conductance level (SCL) was recorded during this anticipation period, capturing any autonomic
arousal in response to the impending choice. Overall SCL during this period was averaged for each
trial, capturing both brief and sustained elevations in skin conductance due to autonomic arousal.
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Figure 4. Life Event Stress Moderating the Relationship between Arousal and Smart Choosing.

Figure 4. Building on prior research that showed life event stress moderated the rate at which implicit
learning to avoid risk took place, it was hypothesized that life event stress may also moderate the
relationship between autonomic arousal and overall number of safe versus risky choices on the
gambling task.
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Figure 5. IA Hypothetically Moderating the Relationship between Arousal and Smart Choosing.

Figure 5. This conceptual diagram shows the hypothesized interaction where sensitivity to internal
signs of arousal, interoceptive awareness (IA), may moderate the relationship between autonomic
arousal, as measured by differences in skin conductance level (risky minus safe)(SCL), and the
overall avoidance of risk as measured by smart choosing scores.
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Figure 6. IA Hypothetically Moderating the Relationship between Autonomic Arousal and Slope of
Learning.

Figure 6. A conceptual diagram showing interoceptive awareness (IA) moderating the relationship
between autonomic arousal, as measured by differences in skin conductance level (risky minus
safe)(SCL), and slope of learning, the rate at which implicit learning takes place.
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Figure 7. Average Risky and Safe Choices on the Iowa Gambling Task.

Figure 7. The number of safe and risky choices for all participants were averaged per block.
Differences between average risky and safe deck choices were greatest in the first block, with more
risky decks being chosen. This trend decreased as the blocks progressed.
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Figure 8. Smart Choosing by Block.

Figure 8. Within each block a smart choosing score was calculated for each subject by subtracting the
total number of risky deck choices from the total number of safe deck choices ((A + B) - (C + D)).
Negative scores indicate a greater total number of risky choices, and positive scores indicate more
safe choices. The average smart choosing scores of all participants for each block is plotted above.
The plotting of these points for each participant was used to create a slope of learning score.
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Figure 9. Correlation between Interoceptive Awareness and overall Smart Choosing

Figure 9. Contrary to what was expected, the correlation between interoceptive awareness (IA), as
measured by scores of cardiac accuracy on the Mental Tracking Task, and smart choosing scores,
safe minus risky choices, across the entire task showed that as IA scores went up the likelihood of
overall smart choosing went down.

78

